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1. Introduction 
What I propose to do here is to specify how this book is to be read so as to be un-
derstood. – It aims to convey a single thought […]. As this one thought is consid-
ered from different sides, it reveals itself respectively as what has been called meta-
physics, what has been called ethics, and what has been called aesthetics; and it is 
only natural that it be all of these, if it really is what I claim it to be. (WR I, Pref., 5)1   
The aim of this paper is to take the above claim about ‘the one thought’ seriously 
and let it guide the current inquiry into Schopenhauer’s conception of aesthetic 
contemplation. The central claim of the paper is that aesthetic contemplation 
rests on what can be called Schopenhauer’s ‘correlation theory of cognition’.2 I 
will argue that this theory leads him to what I call the ‘projection of willing’ on 
the world, which he uses to make his account of aesthetic contemplation mean-
ingful without appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which so 
often leads us to confusion. Arguably the boldest and most contentious proposi-
tion is that ‘this one thought’ is that the world is not only ‘my representation’, 
but equally and inseparably ‘my will’. The current inquiry into aesthetic contem-
plation will take its bearings from the following passage, which the paper aims to 
clarify and render meaningful in another way than appeal to the PSR: 
The only type of cognition that we as individuals possess is subordinate to the 
principle of sufficient reason, which excludes cognition of Ideas; as a result, it is 
certain that, if it is possible for us to raise ourselves from cognition of particular 
things to cognition of the Ideas, this can only take place by means of an alteration 
in the subject that corresponds to and is analogous with that radical change in the 
whole nature of the object, and by virtue of which the subject, in so far as it has 
cognition of an Idea, is no longer an individual. (WR I, 198–199; my own emphasis) 
                                                   
1  Schopenhauer, Arthur: The World as Will and Representation. Volume 1 (WR I). Trans. & ed. by 
Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway, New York 2010.   
2  I have followed Janaway’s translation of Erkenntniß as ‘cognition’ as opposed to ‘knowledge’, 
which is reserved for Wissen; for more on the reasons for doing so see (WR I, xlix).  
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First, however, I will offer some background on the correlation theory of cogni-
tion. Second, I will juxtapose ordinary (or non-aesthetic) cognition to aesthetic 
contemplation from both sides of the correlation such that we can offer a mean-
ingful grasp of what it means independent from the PSR, or as independent as is 
possible given the distinctions he made.  
 
 
2. Cognition, Meaning and the Will  
In his “Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will” (FW)3, Schopenhauer distin-
guishes between what he calls ‘consciousness of one’s own self, i. e., self-conscious-
ness’ and ‘consciousness of other things’ (cf. FW, 37). He elaborates by arguing 
that the target of self-consciousness is the will, or, put differently, when we be-
come conscious of ourselves we do so as ‘willing something’ (cf. FW, 38). Con-
versely, the target of consciousness of other things is ‘something’ perceived as 
distinct from us, independent from us or outside of us. I understand this distinc-
tion as two directions of our focus inherent to any cognition of something, i. e., 
they are inseparable. The previous describes the correlation theory of cognition. 
The following passage underpins it, but due to the approach of his inquiry he 
refers to them as ‘subject’ and ‘object’ instead, but in its essentials it is suggestive 
of the same inseparability or correlation of these two directions of focus:  
But the object [Objekt] as such always presupposes the subject as its necessary 
correlate: so the subject always remains outside the jurisdiction of the principle of 
sufficient reason. The dispute over the reality of the external world is in fact based 
on this improper extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason to 
the subject: given this mistake, the dispute could make no sense, even on its own 
terms […]. To insist that objects exist outside the representation of a subject – 
and to insist that actual objects have a being distinct from their acting – these de-
mands are completely meaningless and contradictory. (WR I, 35) 
What Schopenhauer is striving to show is that for every cognition we find two 
inseparable and irreducible components forming a relationship of fit. For every-
thing we become cognizant of there is also a place from which we become cogni-
zant of it that cannot be separated from the cognition; they fit hand in glove. 
Schopenhauer sought to advance his correlation theory of cognition as an alter-
native to what he saw as a fundamental misunderstanding of readings and con-
ceptions of the Kantian ‘thing in itself'. He sought to defend the proposition 
that the thing in itself “can never be an object [Objekt], because an object [Ob-
jekt] is only its appearance and not what it really is” (WR I, 135). Let us flesh 
this out somewhat.  
                                                   
3  Schopenhauer, Arthur: Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will. In: The Two Fundamental Prob-
lems of Ethics (FW). Trans. & ed. by Christopher Janaway, New York 2009, 31–112. 
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We remember that, for Schopenhauer, the world that we are cognizant of is our 
representation. When we are driven to question and wonder what it is ‘in itself’, 
i. e., ‘independent from us’ and so what it might be like if we overstepped the 
limits of our intellect, we are left puzzled. When we wonder about that ‘some-
thing X’ (the thing in itself) with which our intellect works or that acts on our 
intellect and provides us with the basis for a cognition, the products of our won-
der seem devoid of meaning or significance [Bedeutung] to us. This is because, he 
contends, we are trying to make an ‘object’ of that ‘something X’; in so doing we 
are left only with the shell of an object and this deprives it of meaning. The 
world and its objects are my representation. The world we perceive cannot pos-
sibly be something ‘in itself’ because to perceive a world is to stand in a relation 
to it, but then it is not ‘in itself’.4 This inquiry leave us dissatisfied by leading us 
to fall back onto the same recognition we were trying to overcome, i. e., that all 
this is nothing but ‘my representation’ and that I cannot get rid of my insepara-
ble relation to it: 
[…] we are not satisfied with knowing that we have representations, that they are 
such and such, and that they are joined according to this or that law whose general 
expression is always the principle of sufficient reason. We want to know the 
meaning [Bedeutung] of those representations: we ask if this world is nothing 
more than representation; in which case it would have to pass over us like an in-
substantial dream or a ghostly phantasm [Luftgebilde], not worth our notice; or in 
fact whether it is something else, something more, and if so, what this could be. 
(WR I, 123)  
What drives our inquiry into the true or real nature of the world independent 
from us, which he calls “the need for metaphysics that is peculiar to man alone” 
(WR II, 160)5, is our dissatisfaction with the recognition that the world is our 
representation. We recognize that the world is the product of our sense-organs 
and their inseparable relationship and collaboration to some unknown X (cf. WR 
I, 23–24), which we strive to cognize to our inevitable frustration. Our inquiry 
comes to a halt at the recognition that the world is filled with the spatiotemporal 
and law-like (causal) operations of objects premised on the forces of nature that 
underpin or that serve as their limits. All we can say about the world is that we 
stand in an inseparable relation to it. This approach to our problem and inquiry 
will never satisfy us, Schopenhauer concludes, because we approach it from the 
outside (cf. WR I, 123), i. e., as “a pure subject of cognition (a winged cherub’s 
head without a body)” (WR I, 123–124). It is our approach and not some fact 
                                                   
4  See for example, “[…] being-known of itself contradicts being-in-itself, and everything that is 
known is as such only phenomenon.” (WR II, 198). 
5  Schopenhauer, Arthur: The World as Will and Representation. Volume 2 (WR II). Trans. by E. F. J. 
Payne, New York 1958. See also (WR II, 367–369). 
 32 
that dissatisfies us. Instead of surpassing the ‘pure subject of cognition’ in hope 
to arrive at some object ‘in itself’ beyond it, we should direct our focus to it. 
If our inquiry leads us to the conclusion that the world is nothing but our 
representation, then we are directing our focus entirely outside of ourselves, for 
Schopenhauer, but we have not lost the inseparable connection to ourselves. 
Without self-consciousness we could not possibly conceive of something as 
being ‘outside’ of us. A connection to us is preserved by the recognition that the 
world is our representation. This recognition is informative in a negative sense, 
i. e., it prevents us from exceeding the limits of possible cognition, but it also 
points us in the right direction. We have recognized the position from which the 
world appears as filled with objects and so on. Yet, by focusing entirely on a 
purportedly external object – and even by treating our body as an object – we 
make an error that is akin to denial about the position from which we cognize 
something. Even as pure subjects of cognition we recognize that the world is not 
only representation, but also our representation. We have not yet succeeded in 
plucking our eyes out, so to speak; but our failure to do so is also our salvation, 
Schopenhauer concedes. This is patent when we direct our attention to our-
selves, as we must in certain, perhaps mundane, moments. We are disingenuous 
subject of cognition when we put faith wholly on reason and reflection, which 
are insufficient to show us that the world itself is also something other than our 
representation. Recognizing the previous would make us genuine pure subjects 
of cognition. Yet, to recognize what the world is other than our representation 
we require reason and something else, not reason on its own. This ‘something 
else’ is demonstrated to us in moments when we react to something, i.e. to those 
cognitions that affect us in such a way as to move our body and so become mo-
tives for us.  
We assume that we have a purely objective stance on the world, i. e., inde-
pendent from its subjective correlate, but we deceive ourselves, for Schopenhau-
er. As Koßler rightly claims: 
“Pure” subject of cognition does not mean a subject without object. This is Scho-
penhauer’s foundation of transcendental idealism that subject and object are cor-
relatives.6 
Every cognition has its subjective correlate. Recognizing this, in fact, opens up a 
doorway to another truth about what the world is other than our representation, 
i. e., that “the world is my will” (WR I, 24). Schopenhauer devotes his attention 
to this other truth, but, we should add, only after he has demonstrated and ar-
gued at length that the concept of an ‘object in itself’ is devoid of meaning: 
                                                   
6  Koßler, Matthias: The Artist as Pure Subject of Cognition. In: A Companion to Schopenhauer. 
Ed. by Bart Vandenabeele, Oxford 2012, 193–205. 
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For the world is, on the one side, completely representation, just as it is, on the 
other side, completely will. However, a reality that would be neither of these, but 
rather an object in itself (and unfortunately this is what Kant’s thing in itself has 
surreptitiously degenerated into) is a fantastic absurdity [erträumtes Unding] and 
to assume such a thing is a philosophical will-o’-the wisp. (WR I, 25) 
To dispel this absurdity, he argues, we should remember the position from 
which the world appears as filled with objects. We should reflect on, or direct 
our focus to ourselves in such moments, which is the only place left to look once 
we have exhausted our reflection of things ‘outside of us’. An embodied reaction 
to something demonstrates to us that the world appears as filled with objects if, 
and only if, we are preoccupied with our individuality. An object is perceived as 
an object because only objects can become targets or motives of our individual 
will. When we bring our focus back to ourselves, as happens when we are strong-
ly affected by something, we find that the subjective correlate of our cognition 
of the world is our approaching it as individuals. In such moments, we notice the 
significance or meaning of a world filled with objects; we must perceive the 
world in this way when we assume the position of an individual. This demon-
strates to us the significance of the correlation between ‘how our world appears’ 
and ‘to whom it appears so’ that seemed so unyielding when we sought to cog-
nize the ‘thing in itself’.  
What does it mean to be an individual and be “rooted in this world” (WR I, 
124), for Schopenhauer? He contends that individuality stems from the ‘special 
relation’ to one of the many ‘objects’ we cognize in the world: 
The subject of cognition is an individual precisely because of this special relation 
with the one body that, aside from all this, is only a representation like any other. 
(WR I, 128) 
The one body that Schopenhauer refers to is our own body, and the special rela-
tion is our willing something, which is always through the body because, 
[w]illing and doing are different only for reflection: in actuality they are one. Eve-
ry true, genuine and immediate act of will is instantly and immediately also the 
appearance of an act of the body. (WR I, 125)   
Our body is not only an object among objects, but likewise identical with our 
willing or doing something. The difference between our willing and cognizing 
for Schopenhauer is that in willing something we perceive an identity relation-
ship between our will and body, but not a causal relationship as we perceive with 
all other objects in the world: 
An act of the will and an act of the body are not two different states cognized ob-
jectively, linked together in a causal chain, they do not stand in a relation of cause 
and effect; they are one and the same thing, only given in two entirely different 
ways: in one case immediately and in the other case to the understanding in intui-
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tion. An action of the body [Aktion des Leibes] is nothing but an objectified act of 
will, i. e. an act of will that has entered intuition. (WR I, 124–125) 
We are individuals, for him, when we ‘will something’ and this evidences a dif-
ferent relationship to one of the objects in the world that is not just causal, but 
equally and inseparably an identity relationship.7 In other words, our body, the 
object it responds to and the world appears different when we will something or 
find something to will. The world seems meaningful when we identify with some-
thing in it; in most cases and by default (but not always, as we will see below) 
what we identify with is our own body.  
The world appears to us as filled with objects because of our approach to it as 
individuals that look for something to will; the latter characterises the dissatisfied 
pure subject of cognition or the ‘metaphysical need’. The subjective correlate to 
the world filled with objects is our willing (or doing) something. There is an 
identity or a by-fit relationship between our willing something and representa-
tion of a world filled with objects. It must be so, for Schopenhauer, or our own 
body would only ever appear as an object, but, at least in some moments, it does 
not. We react to, desire or strive after objects through our body and in doing so 
an object appears meaningful to us in a way that is not encapsulated in a causal 
account. It is a matter of fact that our relationship to our own body is distinct in 
kind from our relationship to foreign bodies that do not (in some sense) come 
into contact with it and so become part of our will, i. e., are incorporated into it. 
Understanding this distinction, I want to argue, is crucial for rendering meaning-
ful his conception of aesthetic contemplation and the true status of the Scho-
penhauerian ‘Idea’. 
The correlation between subject and object suggests that the world itself (as 
opposed to ‘something’ in it) appears different to those immersed in aesthetic 
contemplation than it does to those immersed in the ordinary tumult of their 
urges and needs.8 In aesthetic contemplation we experience the same correlation 
between subject and object as in any cognition of something. But the sense of 
‘object’ in the ‘object of aesthetic contemplation’ is different from the sense of 
‘object’ in the ‘object of non-aesthetic cognition’.9 We can distinguish ‘objects’ 
                                                   
7  For more on the relationship between what I call the ‘causal’ and ‘identity’ relationship, and why 
Schopenhauer relies on one over the other, see Koßler, Matthias: Life is but a Mirror: On the 
Connection between Ethics, Metaphysics and Character in Schopenhauer. In: European Journal 
of Philosophy 16:2 (2008), 230–250. Koßler’s reading offers a wealth of insight into Schopenhau-
er’s philosophical manoeuvres at the intersection between metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics.   
8  Something similar is the case about the world of the moral genius, though I cannot defend nor 
demonstrate this here. 
9  I am grateful to Bart Vandenabeele for pressing me to clarify this distinction. One suggestion 
made by Vandenabeele is to look at the difference between Objekt and Gegenstand in Schopen-
hauer’s usage. Alas, after much labor, I have found that Schopenhauer too often uses the two in-
terchangeably, e. g.: “a child learns to have intuitions by comparing the impressions of the same 
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in the broad and narrow sense. The broad sense refers to the subject-matter or 
the target of our cognition (or of willing), i. e., to the ‘something X’ we are fo-
cusing or directing our attention towards. This sense does not imply the kind of 
relationship we as subjects of cognition have to it, only that we have some rela-
tionship to it; we can call it the abstract sense. The narrow (or the more con-
crete) sense of ‘object’, refers to the kind of relationship we have to it. We cog-
nize something as an ‘object’ in the narrow sense if we relate to it in such a way 
as that it can relate to our will (i. e., it can yield a motive). Thus, it is an ‘object’ 
in this sense if it can be utilized by us towards some end we may have or are 
looking for. In this sense, the ‘object’ has the status of a tool in a tool-box and is 
seen as tool in the tool-box. In both senses we take an interest ‘in something’, 
but the kind of interest differs. Accordingly, the difference between the two 
senses of ‘object’ does not rest solely on the target of our cognition, nor solely on 
our approach to it, but on the relation between us and the target. It is for this 
reason that we should read the subject-object correlation as a by-fit relationship. 
Henceforth, and for clarity, I will use ‘object’ to refer to the narrow sense and 
‘target’ to refer to the broad sense. 
The insight presented to us by the correlation theory of cognition is that we 
do not take only one kind of interest in the targets of our cognition, i. e., as 
something that we can utilize or that permits action upon it, or the kind of inter-
est premised on our own individual will, urges and needs. There are other kinds 
of interest we can take in something. Where the proposition shows its novelty is 
that how something appears changes in accordance with the kind of interest we 
take in it. Some targets of cognition can change our interest by their independ-
ent effect on us, but the key claim is that unless our interest changes, our percep-
tion of it does not no matter how effective it is said to be or it appears to be (or 
supposedly is) for others.  
How, then, does the above discussion relate to aesthetic contemplation? The 
correlation theory of cognition shows us, I believe, that what gives the targets of 
our cognition meaning is the position from which we focus on them. What 
                                                                                                                       
object [Objekt] received by the various senses; how in fact this is the only thing that sheds light 
on so many sensory phenomena such as seeing a single image with two eyes; or the experience of 
double vision when squinting or when viewing objects [Gegenstände] at different distances from 
the eye in a single glance” (WR I, 33). It is hard to distinguish one use from another in the previ-
ous passage. Yet, there are other passages where the case for a difference finds a firmer foothold: 
“it would therefore be absurd to demand that they be established through experience (if by this 
is meant the real world outside of us, itself an intuitive representation) or brought before the 
eyes or the imagination like objects [Objekte] of intuition. Concepts can only be thought, not 
intuited, and only the effects that people bring about through concepts are objects [Gegenstän-
de] of experience proper” (WR I, 62). It is difficult to expect terminological consistency from 
Schopenhauer at this level of analysis. I have therefore decided to suggest a distinction between 
‘object’ in the broad and narrow sense premised on other distinctions and arguments he makes. 
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makes the world meaningful is that we are more than the ‘representing’ subject; 
we are, in fact, looking for something to will. The pure subject of cognition lives 
in a world that appears foreign, empty, and detached, i. e. an object among ob-
jects, whilst its ‘willing something’ makes it appear meaningful or significant to 
the subject. The subject is not purely cognizing a world filled with objects, but is 
searching for something to will. The world appears meaningless, because in that 
precise moment we are not reacting to something through  our body. What we 
notice when we do react to something is that our perception of the target is still 
a perception of it as an object, or as something that ‘permits willing’. There is 
therefore a distinction in degree between the sensation that is the subjective 
correlate of an intuition (i.e. the basis of all of our perceptions and the concepts 
that arise from them, e. g., let’s say an apple) and the more powerful or destabiliz-
ing sensation that is the subjective correlate of the same object (the apple as it is 
appears when we are hungry or desire it) now perceived as a motive [Motiv].10 
Objects are the kinds of target of our cognition that can be motives for our will 
even if they are not so now.  
Schopenhauer does not stop there, however. He wants to demonstrate that 
what we perceive can have significance or meaning in another way that is not 
encapsulated by ‘objects’ and their more effective siblings, i. e., ‘motives’; that is, 
through aesthetic contemplation. There is purportedly a difference in kind be-
tween an object (and-or a motive) and an ‘Idea’. Nevertheless, we immediately 
notice a problem with this proposition. If the ‘will’ is what gives meaning to the 
target of our cognition, then the aesthetic contemplator is likewise ‘willing 
something’ or the Ideas she purportedly perceives are as meaningless as the ‘ob-
ject in itself’ that he so vehemently rejects and constitutes the foundations of his 
philosophy. The proposition that disinterested subjects are actually interested is 
something we have to swallow. Though, I will argue, it is easier to swallow if, 
like we saw with the two conceptions of ‘object’, there is a broader and a nar-
rower sense of ‘will’. The sense in which we should read the aesthetic contempla-
tor’s ‘will’ is in the broad sense, i.e., as the necessary correlate to making some-
thing meaningful, rather than suggestive of what ‘we’ (as individuals or humans) 
will in some object, i. e., its meaning to us. If the previous is the case, then we 
                                                   
10  Schopenhauer unfortunately only intimates this relation between a sensation that yields cogni-
tion of an object and the sensation that yields cognition of a ‘motive’ most clearly in his discus-
sion of the relation between light and beauty. In any case, the presuppositions for it are laid out 
in the will-body identity: “Just as a human being is dark and vehement impulse [Drang] of will-
ing (signified by the pole of the genitals as the focal point of willing) and at the same time eter-
nal, free, serene [heiter] subject of pure cognition (signified by the pole of the brain), similarly 
and corresponding to this contrast, the sun is a source of both light, the condition for the most 
perfect type of cognition, and for precisely this reason the most joyful [erfreulichste] of things, – 
and heat, the primary condition for all life, i. e. of all appearance of the will on its higher levels. 
Thus, what heat is for the will, light is for cognition (WR I, 227). 
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should jettison the proposition that an Idea is distinct in kind from as object 
(and-or motive) and flesh out what their difference hinges on.  
There are conceptual knots in what Schopenhauer says about the Ideas that 
need untying. I hope to at least prepare the ground for our addressing them by 
inviting us to debate the issue through his correlation theory of cognition. The 
following questions guide my inquiry: How different is an Idea from an object 
or motive, and what does it hinge on? How different is a ‘willing individual’ 
from a ‘disinterested individual’ and what underpins it? Can we argue that the 
so-called disinterested individual is just ‘willing differently’ as opposed to ‘not 
willing’?11  
Construing the Ideas as cognition of something from the perspective of a 
‘pure subject of cognition’, I will argue, can mislead us in subtle ways. This paper 
will focus on how construing the Ideas as ‘things’ or as ‘something’ separate 
from this dog or flower that we contemplate misleads us. I will also argue that 
what makes the Idea meaningful is our willing something, albeit not in the sense 
of yielding an object and-or motive. This becomes clearer as we venture into 
demonstrating the difference between the subject-object correlation of ordinary 
or non-aesthetic cognition and of aesthetic contemplation. To help us along we 
should bear in mind the following two correlations: 
 
A) Willing individual – object (is an object both in the broad and narrow sense)  
B) Disinterested Individual – Idea (is an object in the broad sense only) 
 
‘A’ refers to ‘non-aesthetic contemplation’, whilst ‘B’ refers to ‘aesthetic con-
templation’. Both constitute the subject-object correlation foundational to ‘cog-
nition of something’, but refer to different kinds of cognitions. The ‘Idea’ and 
the ‘object’ are both targets of our cognition and thus fall on the objective side 
of the subject-object correlation. Nevertheless, each is suggestive of a different 
relation between the subject and object (or between ‘self-consciousness’ and 
‘consciousness of other things’, or between the ‘will’ and its ‘motive’). My aim 
will be to make this difference meaningful and show the premises on which it 
rests, which we can summarize by what I will call the ‘projection of the will or 
willing’ on the target of our cognition. I will begin by juxtaposing the ‘Idea’ to 
the ‘object’ whilst defending the proposition that ‘projecting willing’ on some-
thing is what makes the Idea meaningful in its own right and independent from 
the PSR. I will flesh out the previous claims by starting with the objective corre-
late, i. e., the Idea, which Schopenhauer defines as the “most adequate objecthood 
                                                   
11  Schopenhauer is open to this solution of the conceptual problem and demonstrates it clearly 
through his discussion of tragedy: “[…] precisely in this way we become aware that there is still 
left in us something different that we cannot possibly know positively, but only negatively, as 
that which does not will life” (WR II, 433). 
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of the will” (WR I, 197). Subsequently, I will assess the subjective side, i.e., “the 
pure, will-less, timeless subject of cognition” (WR I, 223) by juxtaposing it to 
what might be called ordinary, non-aesthetic subjective correlate.  
 
 
3. The Objective Correlate: Schopenhauerian Ideas and the Projection of Willing 
Aesthetic contemplation is a kind of cognition; it consists of something cognized 
(the so-called ‘Idea’) and its inseparable subjective correlate (the ‘pure, will-less, 
painless, timeless subject of cognition’). This serves to indicate, for Schopenhauer, 
that even Ideas are representations or targets of cognition. An Idea is a target of 
cognition,  not an object fit to be utilized by us. This leaves the Idea as meaning-
less as an object ‘in itself’, however, which is not the conclusion that Schopen-
hauer wants to arrive at, or his entire philosophical project rests on the mistake 
of thinking that the world is something other than my representation. What then 
makes the ‘Schopenhauerian’ Idea meaningful? This question guides the current 
section.  
The objective correlate of aesthetic contemplation, or ‘Idea’, is distinct from 
an object in one way. The target is no longer cognized in terms of its relations to 
others, but what it might be ‘in and of itself’. This claim is meaningless, however. 
What kind of cognition of something are we left with if we isolate the target of 
our cognition from its relations? We cannot possibly subtract all of the effects 
that other targets had (or will have) on it and still be left with something resem-
bling cognition of an object. It is thus misleading to claim that we can (or should) 
separate the target from its relations and claim that we are left with the cognition 
of an object. We can, however, claim that we do not cognize an object, but an 
Idea. What we are left with now is the ostensibly easier challenge of making 
sense of Ideas without appeal to objects and what pertains to them. How do we 
make the claim that aesthetic contemplation involves cognition of an Idea mean-
ingful without appeal to objects?  
Schopenhauer’s proposition is that we no longer construe the target of our 
cognition as synonymous or identical with its relations and effects; we do not 
identify the stone or dog with these relations. They sink to the background or are 
rendered out of focus. This does not entail that they no longer exist, nor that we 
somehow perceive another ‘object’ we call an ‘Idea’. We are misled if we con-
strue Ideas as ‘objects’ rather than ‘targets’ of cognition and so by confounding 
the two uses of ‘object’ we distinguished above. The Idea, I will argue, is what 
the target wills to be; we project the will onto it. What we perceive, or at least try 
to and frustratingly fail, is what the target of our cognition wills to be. It is the 
same target we perceive whilst the nature of our perception has changed. The 
target’s relations to other targets are suspended from focus and so their nature 
has changed; they are not ‘obliterated’ nor have they ‘vanished’. The dog is not 
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replaced by another thing we call the ‘Idea’ of a dog. We perceive the same dog, 
albeit in a different manner and this, as Vandenabeele rightly claims, “enables us 
to become alive to usually unnoticed significant features”12. What allows us to be 
attentive in this way is our treating the dog not as an object (or a motive), but as 
‘willing’ in an extended sense. 
What Schopenhauer aims to show is that when we aesthetically contemplate 
something we apply to it the same relationship we have to our own body: the 
double cognition we have of it as will [Wille] and representation [Vorstellung]. 
This cognition underpins Schopenhauer’s propositions about aesthetic contem-
plation: 
We now clearly understand our double cognition of the essence and operation of 
our own body, a cognition that we are given in two completely different ways; and 
we will go on to use this cognition as a key to the essence of every appearance in 
nature; and when it comes to objects other than our own body, objects that have 
not been given to us in this double manner but only as representations in our con-
sciousness, we will judge them on the analogy with our body, assuming that, since 
they are on the one hand representations just like the body and are in this respect 
homogeneous with it, then on the other hand, what remains after disregarding 
their existence as representation of a subject must have the same inner essence as 
what we call will. (WR I, 129; emphasis added)13 
What makes the Idea meaningful, for Schopenhauer, is that we no longer per-
ceive the target of our cognition as an object, but as a willing thing that has a 
similar relationship to its body as we do. Koßler likewise rightly recognizes how 
the focus is shifted from ourselves to the target during aesthetic contemplation: 
[…] the only way to perceive things not in relation to the own interest is to con-
template them as creating their relations to other things and to the perceiver by 
themselves.14 
                                                   
12  Vandenabeele, Bart: Aesthetic Disinterestedness in Kant and Schopenhauer. In: Estetika: The Central 
European Journal of Aesthetics 49:1 (2012), 45–70; 59. 
13  Schopenhauer clarifies this further in a later passage: “[…] every individual is on the one hand 
the cognitive subject, i.e. the complementary condition for the possibility of the whole objective 
world, and on the other hand a single appearance of the will, which is precisely what objectifies 
itself in every thing. But this duality of our essence does not remain in a self-subsisting unity: 
otherwise we would be able to be aware of ourselves in ourselves and independent of the objects of 
cognition and willing: but this is absolutely impossible” (WR I, 304; footnote). Therefore, only 
when we will something do we become self-conscious, for Schopenhauer. Moreover, it is only in 
self-consciousness and so following our willing something that the target of our cognition ac-
quires significance and meaning [Bedeutung]. What then, is the significance or meaning of the 
Idea, and how does it acquire it if we assume the standpoint of pure, will-less subjects of cogni-
tion, i. e., ‘winged cherub’s heads without a body’? This is perhaps the crux of his philosophical 
problem. 
14 Koßler, Artist as Subject, 200. 
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We project the will on it and this permits us to no longer perceive a world filled 
with objects etc., but with willing things. This, for Schopenhauer, requires an 
inference by ‘analogy’ and thus reason.15  Nonetheless, to perceive indirectly 
what cannot be directly perceived we likewise require imagination, because no 
target of cognition is perceived as ‘will’ in itself. Even our own will is not per-
ceived as it is in itself, but through our acts of will over time. We notice, then, 
that Schopenhauer does not escape the Kantian limits placed upon cognition. 
Even the cognition of the will must accord with the subject-object correlation: 
I do not have cognition of my will as a whole, in its unity, in perfect accordance 
with its essence; rather I cognize it only in its individual acts, which is to say in 
time, time being the form in which my body (like every other object) appears: this 
is why the body is the condition of cognition of my will. (WR I, 126; emphasis 
added) 
We do not have direct access to ‘the will’ through our body, but an indication of 
it through an act of will over time. What is immediate for us is the identity rela-
tionship between our will and body demonstrated by an act of will, not the cog-
nition of the will, which is always mediated by time. It is this identity relation-
ship that does not permit us to claim that our will is an object. When the will is 
made an object it is of the same kind as any other object of our cognition. To 
perceive our will as an object is to perceive a causal relationship rather than an 
identity relationship between the will and the action. An act of will is not an 
inference or the recognition of a causal relation between two distinct things, but 
an identity relationship between the will and the ‘object through which it ex-
presses itself’, i.e., the body, which thus makes it our body.16 Therefore, we rec-
ognize the identity relationship between the will and body when acting wilfully 
or through acts of will.  
Our acts of will stand closer to us or we identify with them more clearly than 
anything else we perceive as ‘our representation’ or as an ‘object’. If we only ever 
perceived our acts of will as our representation, then our life would unfold like a 
movie whose director is some strange unknown thing X, rather than us. Notice, 
however, that though we do not make an inference from our will to our body, we 
do make an inference from our act of will to our character; our character is a 
construct of reason based on the will-body identity. We use our motives as pieces 
of a puzzle presenting our character, not as constituting our whole character; 
reason is required to unify these pieces into a whole picture. ‘To will’ is different 
                                                   
15  Schopenhauer claims that an Idea is “made possible by the unification of imagination and reason” 
(WR I, 63), so we can claim that it at least partially requires an inference. The role of reason in 
this inference by analogy is evident in his claim that the double cognition “can only be estab-
lished by raising immediate consciousness, concrete cognition, to rational knowledge or transfer-
ring it to abstract cognition” (WR I, 127).  
16  For more on the will-body identity and ‘the act of will’ see Koßler, Artist as Subject, 194–195. 
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from ‘to cognize’, but their difference collapses when and only when ‘we will 
something’. In aesthetic contemplation, we make an inference from the target of 
our cognition to its being a willing thing just as we are premised on the fact that 
we sometimes cognize our body as an object among objects. I believe this infer-
ence is what he refers to when he claims that we should judge the targets of our 
cognition on the analogy with our own body (cf. WR I, 129). We use our rela-
tionship to our body as the basis for the analogy, and make the leap that allows 
us to assume that the target appears as an object to us, but ‘in itself’ it wills much 
like we do. The latter is the condition or ground of our no longer cognizing ‘ob-
jects’, but ‘Ideas’.  
In aesthetic contemplation, the target of cognition is not perceived as an ob-
ject, but as willing like we are; we project the will on it. This changes of our per-
ception of it qualitatively rather than quantitatively. We do not perceive some-
thing ‘else’ or ‘more’ when we perceive the dog’s Idea; we perceive the same dog 
differently. We do not lose the connection to the target of our cognition, but 
there is a qualitative change in the target that does not entail or presuppose a 
change in ‘it itself’ and independent from us; another person may still see ‘just 
another dog’.  
Schopenhauer grounds aesthetic contemplation on the kind of cognition 
made possible by the projection of willing on the world by analogy to the double 
cognition we have of the body as will and representation. The projection of will-
ing paves the way for our devoting our focus entirely to the target of our cogni-
tion.17 We must not construe this as projection of one’s ‘individual self’ or what 
is specific to human willing, but of the relationship we have to our body in react-
ing to something deemed as (pleasant or unpleasant) to us. Our body is a bridge 
between us and the world we perceive. In aesthetic contemplation, we project on 
the targets of our cognition this same bridge, i. e., that their body and willing are 
one. Instead of perceiving them as objects causing or being caused to do some-
thing, we perceive them as pushing and pulling ‘something’, or striving after 
‘something’, or overpowering rather than being overpowered by something. We 
                                                   
17  The projection of the will is at the heart of Schopenhauer’s philosophy: “[…] we must learn to 
understand nature from ourselves, not ourselves from nature. What is directly known to us must 
give us the explanation of what is only indirectly known, not conversely” (WR II, 196). Yet, he is 
careful to make clear that ‘will’ should not be understood in the sense of human willing: “[…] 
anyone incapable of broadening the concept in the way we require will remain in a state of per-
petual misunderstanding, using the word will to mean just the one species that has borne the 
name so far, the will that is accompanied by cognition and is expressed exclusively in accordance 
with motives – and indeed only through abstract motives, under the guidance of reason” (WR I, 
136). The word ‘will’ can mislead his readers, but he has done enough to caution us over its use; 
he uses it to permit a change in what we perceive as an object meaningful to us in another way, i. 
e., as something that wills. If we do not grant Schopenhauer this other way of making things 
meaningful, and the inference by analogy he grounds it on, then his thoughts are left shrouded in 
an uncanny mist arguably improper to philosophy.  
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take a stance on them as if they also will. This makes the target of our cognition 
stand out in a different way, i. e., as the representation or image of a willing thing 
rather than the result of relations (causal and spatiotemporal) between objects 
premised on some meaningless unknown force.  
By projecting the will on the target the aesthetic contemplator does not per-
ceive it as an object, but as it endlessly, frustratingly strives to become, i. e., its 
Idea. The meaning of the ‘Idea’ is based on our (at least trying to) perceive the 
target ‘as it is striving to be’ or as ‘it would be if nothing was striving against it’. 
It is in this sense, i. e., of seeing things as striving or struggling (i. e. willing), 
that the nature of our perception changes in aesthetic contemplation. The differ-
ence hinges on, I argue, projection of ‘willing’ on ‘forces of nature’, which he 
construes as “qualitates occultae” (WR I, 147). The following quotes are im-
mensely revealing on how the nature of perception changes during aesthetic 
contemplation: 
Everywhere in nature we see conflict, we see struggle, we see victory changing 
hands; later we will recognize this more clearly as the internal rupture that is essen-
tial to the will. Each level of the will’s objectivation is in conflict with the others 
over matter, space and time […]. In fact, this conflict is itself only the revelation 
of the internal rupture that is essential to the will. (WR I, 171–172) 
A more perfect Idea will result from such a victory over several lower Ideas or ob-
jectivations of the will; and by absorbing an analogue of higher power from each 
of the Ideas it overpowers, it will gain an entirely new character: the will is objecti-
fied in a new and clearer fashion […]. No victory without a struggle: since the 
higher Idea or objectivation of the will can come forward only by overpowering 
the lower Ideas, it encounters resistance on their part. Even when the lower Ideas 
are quickly brought into submission, they nonetheless keep striving to express 
their essence in a complete and self-sufficient manner. (WR I, 173) 
We no longer perceive the target as an object, but as the ‘outcome of its success-
ful or unsuccessful struggle’. To perceive a target as striving, struggling, overpow-
ering etc. is to ‘project the will’ on it, which means that we no longer perceive an 
object. Prior to projecting the will, all we perceive are spatiotemporal and causal 
relations between objects premised on meaningless ‘forces of nature’. Therefore, 
only Ideas in Schopenhauer’s sense (not objects, nor motives) have the kind of 
relations whose meaning rests on our relationship to our own body: overpower-
ing something, striving for something, struggling against something.  
The juxtaposition between perception of an object and that of an Idea is ob-
scurely summarised in the following passage: 
As soon as cognition, the world of representation, is suppressed, absolutely nothing 
is left but mere will, blind urge. The fact that it retains its objecthood and be-
comes representation presupposes at once both subject and object: but the fact 
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that this objecthood is the pure, complete and adequate objecthood of the will 
presupposes the object as Idea, free from the forms of the principle of sufficient 
reason, and the subject as pure subject of cognition, free from individuality and 
servitude to the will. (WR I, 203) 
The Idea is the most complete cognition we can have of something, but it re-
mains a cognition of something. It is not the cognition of an object nor another 
entity to which the target of our cognition relates; both are only able to yield an 
object, not an Idea.  
In sum, there is no other ‘thing’ or ‘entity’ apart from the will and its repre-
sentation. We are not cognizing two distinct things called ‘Idea’ and ‘object’, but 
having two distinct cognitions of the same thing. Young rightly intimates that 
Schopenhauer does not construe the Ideas as things, but as a kind of perception 
of something, 
‘Idea’ is, in his aesthetic theory, a mere façon de parler, a merely nominal object. 
The best way of putting his view is to say that what is special about the artist is 
not that he perceives the Idea instead of the individual, but rather perceives the in-
dividual as Idea.18  
Our cognition of an Idea is thus a cognition of ‘the individual’, not some onto-
logical entity that is ‘somehow’ distinct, but which we ‘somehow’ perceive in 
‘this’ individual. Our whole perception of things has shifted in aesthetic con-
templation, but not the connection with the target of our cognition that was 
previously perceived as an object or motive. Young, however, overshoots the 
mark when he claims that the Idea, is not 
[…] something separate from the individual that the artist sees, but rather ‘the 
universal in the particular’ (WR II: 379; emphasis added).19  
The claim that we perceive ‘the universal in the particular’ is not wrong, but 
pushes us into an unnecessarily obscure position that makes the problem return 
through the backdoor. Consider what meaning we can give to the above claim if 
it is not conceptual, i.e., under the PSR, which entails that we are not perceiving 
an ‘Idea’. Aesthetic contemplation does not overstep the Kantian limits for cog-
nition in general. The relationship we have to the target when perceiving it as an 
Idea is as if it ‘wills’, or overpowers, or strives, or struggles and so on, which is 
premised on our willing something in the extended sense. We project this onto 
the world to saturate it with a meaning or significance to us in another way than 
its being a (possible) motive for our will, which is what ‘an object’ means to us.   
Schopenhauerian Ideas are not Platonic Forms, they are a way of rendering 
meaningful what Plato called a Form in a manner different from Plato.20 The 
                                                   
18  Young, Julian: Schopenhauer. New York 2005, 132.  
19  Young, Schopenhauer, 131. 
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difference is that between ‘how something appears to us’ and ‘what it wills to 
appear as to us’. The Schopenhauerian ‘Idea’ is a kind of cognition of the target. 
He therefore aims to sit between Kant and Plato and his reasons for doing so are 
summarized in the following passage, which merits quoting in full: 
This is because, just as Kant claimed, the thing in itself is supposed to be free of all 
the forms that are attached to cognition as such: and (as will be shown in the ap-
pendix) Kant was simply mistaken in failing to consider being-an-object-for-a-
subject as one of these forms, and indeed before all others, since precisely this is 
the first and most universal form of all appearance, i. e. representation; he should 
therefore have explicitly denied that his thing in itself was an object, as this would 
have saved him from that great inconsistency, an inconsistency that was discov-
ered quite early. By contrast, the Platonic Idea is necessarily an object, something 
cognized, a representation and, for precisely this reason (but for only this reason), distinct 
from the thing in itself. It has merely shed the subordinate forms of appearance 
(which are all comprehended under the principle of sufficient reason) – or rather it 
has not yet entered into these forms; but it has retained the first and most general 
form, that of representation in general, of being an object for a subject.” (WR I, 
197; my own emphasis) 
He wants Plato’s insight to be wed to Kant’s epistemic boundaries. Notice that 
cognition of the Idea leads us to two senses of ‘individuality’ and ‘universality’ 
premised entirely on our now looking at the targets of our cognition differently; 
just as we saw with its relations. The target of cognition, as an object, is cognized 
relative to other targets of cognition seen as objects. Ordinary cognition yields 
an individual in the sense of an object only functionally separable from other 
objects, but relates to them by serving some ‘function’, which is as part of some 
wider whole. They serve different functions either for us, or for some independent 
will, e. g., for ‘Nature’ or ‘God’. They are still related to each other before relat-
ing to some independent will, because we conceive them as serving ‘some func-
tion’. This is the kind of ‘individuality’ a hammer possesses relative to a screw-
driver in a ‘tool-box’, i. e., as fit for some use that the worker (i. e. the legislator 
or owner of the ‘wider whole’) puts it to. This is not the individuality or univer-
sality inherent to aesthetic contemplation. Ideas revise our conceptions by 
changing their meaning. We are still speaking of individuality and universality 
but what these mean under aesthetic contemplation is different from the PSR. 
The claim that an Idea is another object trying to represent itself in this individual 
object, e. g., a perfect ‘tool’ without a wielder is misleading and akin to what he 
                                                                                                                       
20  Though, I admit, he is ambivalent about whether or not his Ideas are just Platonic Forms; he 
sometimes claims that he does not intend them in Plato’s sense, e. g., “given our view, we cannot 
agree with Plato” (WR I, 236); also, “many of his [Plato’s] examples and descriptions of Ideas 
are applicable only to concepts” (WR I, 259). At other times, he claims, “the Ideas, in my sense, 
which agrees with the original Platonic meaning, of this grossly misused word” (WR II, 364). 
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saw as the ‘object in itself’. The Idea is not an object. It is perceived as the out-
come of a struggle between opposed willing things. Absolutely nothing about a 
world filled with objects and their spatiotemporal and causal relations, not even 
forces of nature – which under this view are qualitates occultae – suggests any-
thing like a ‘struggle’. To perceive a struggle, or, put differently, to make such a 
perception meaningful, we have to first project what we experience in the first-
person as willing something.  
Wicks rightly reads the Ideas as premised on an “idealizing act of the imagina-
tion”21, but we should likewise emphasize the role of reason. Imagination is 
needed for intuitive representation or perception of an Idea, but reason is re-
quired to make the inference by analogy from our own relationship to our own 
body to the target of cognition having this same relationship. Imagination works 
in combination with reason to yield Ideas, rather than ‘an object’ (in itself).22 He 
is also right to construe an Idea as ideal, but we must clarify that it not our ideal 
for the object nor one taken from another perspective that is other than the indi-
vidual target’s own. It is what the target’s individuality consists of when we aes-
thetically contemplate it: it consists of its willing to be this or that. It is the latter 
that gives meaning to the proposition that aesthetic contemplation yields “this 
object’s clearest image” (WR I, 202; my own emphasis); though Schopenhauer 
should have said the ‘target’s’ rather than the ‘object’s’ clearest image to avoid 
confusion. 
A central objection to Schopenhauer’s account of the Ideas in the literature is 
that aesthetic contemplation is not concerned with the target’s particularity, but 
with the ‘idea’ of which the ‘object’ is an ‘instantiation’. The worry that is voiced 
is that the object’s ‘particularity’ is rendered ‘irrelevant’ or ‘transcended’ by aes-
thetic contemplation, because the ‘Idea’ is purportedly universal whereas the 
target (which they dub the ‘object’) is not. This objection is clearly stated by Soll 
who contends that 
[…] the object of an aesthetic experience is not made up of individuals, distin-
guished by their locations in space and time, but by the a-spatial and a-temporal 
Ideas or Platonic Forms, the eternal, unchanging species or types of things that all 
individuals exemplify.23 
Notice, however, that this reading conceives of the relation between the Idea and 
the individual in an ontological or what might be called a speculative sense; it 
brings back the PSR and yields cognition of an object. It is thus prone to positing 
                                                   
21  Wicks, Robert: Schopenhauer. Oxford 2008, 98.  
22  For more on the cooperation of reason and imagination in aesthetic contemplation see Koßler, 
Artist as Subject, 201–203.  
23  Soll, Ivan: Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the Redemption of Life Through Art. In: Willing and 
Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator, ed. by Christopher Janaway, Oxford 1998, 
79–105; 93.  
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two distinct ‘things’ (one physical and one metaphysical) that somehow relate. 
Yet, as Hamlyn rightly remarks,  
Schopenhauer is less concerned with the ontological status of the Ideas than with 
their logical character as representations. Hence, when he says that the grades of 
the objectification of the will are Ideas in Plato’s sense, we are not meant to ask 
whether in that case they exist in another world or whatever. 24 
We have to be careful to clarify what we mean by the ‘logical’ status of some-
thing, however. Do we construe the Idea and the object as two distinct things 
that relate ‘logically’? We have not advanced our interpretation by speaking of 
two distinct things. We should hold on to the claim that the difference between 
object and Idea is that between two distinct cognitions of the same thing; this 
preserves the identity relationship between the Idea and the target, which is the 
‘object’ seen differently.  
The status of the Idea is often understood as a universal ‘thing’ in juxtaposi-
tion to a particular ‘thing’ with which it relates in terms of subsumption.25 The 
previous can mislead us by permitting a break with the identity relationship that 
grounds aesthetic contemplation. We should clarify that the relationship Scho-
penhauer posits between the Idea and the object is not causal, but one of identity. 
As Hamlyn points out, the relationship between the target and its Idea is not 
synonymous with that between a ‘particular’ and its ‘universal’ ‘type’ or ‘kind’. His 
reading implies an identity relationship without fully fleshing it out:  
Grades of the objectification of the will are not just kinds either, if that term sug-
gests something that is merely universal in character and simply instantiated in a 
number of particulars – a mere class. There remains a gulf between particulars and 
grades of objectification of the will, just because the will has nothing to do with 
plurality. The grade of the will's objectivity which is the oak is the oak; not the 
class of oaks, but the prototype oak which no single oak tree in the world may 
quite match or live up to. It is an ideal entity, something that is both token and 
type.26   
The universality suggestive of the Idea cannot be modeled on reason alone, but 
on the combination of reason and imagination. What is universal about the ‘will-
                                                   
24  Hamlyn, David: Schopenhauer. London 1980, 112.  
25  This reading of the ‘Ideas’ is prolific in the literature, see, e. g., Gardiner, Patrick: Schopenhauer. 
Bristol 1963, 205–207 and 213–214; Vandenabeele, Bart: Schopenhauer on Sense Perception and 
Aesthetic Cognition. In: The Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 (2011) 37–57; 51–53; Vandena-
beele, Bart: Schopenhauer and the Objectivity of Art. In: A Companion to Schopenhauer. Ed. by 
Bart Vandenabeele, Oxford 2012, 219–233; Atwell, Character of the World, 148–150; Magee, Bryan: 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. New York 1983, 165; Janaway, Christopher: Self and World in 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy. New York 1989, 9–10; Wicks, Schopenhauer, 107; Young, Schopen-
hauer, 130. 
26  Hamlyn, Schopenhauer, 106. 
 47 
ing thing’ (Idea) that is the dog is not synonymous to what is universal about the 
concept ‘dog’. Our views on universality and individuality have shifted the mo-
ment we understand the relationship between the ‘concept’ dog and the ‘object’ 
dog under aesthetic contemplation. The latter sees an identity between the Idea 
and the target that is, supposedly, its representative. 
We cannot fault readings that are tempted to make sense of the Idea by using 
what obtains only under the PSR. This is because Schopenhauer’s own abstruse 
descriptions of the Ideas are sometimes misleading (cf. WR I, 216 and 219; 
WR II, 372). These passages do not tell us what makes an Idea meaningful under 
aesthetic contemplation, but tries to compare it to, and thereby misleadingly 
invites us to make it meaningful under, cognition through the PSR. Schopenhauer 
is adamant to prevent a ‘conceptual’ interpretation of the Idea, however, which is 
the only meaning we can acquire through the PSR. This is also what he found 
unsatisfactory in Plato’s account of the Forms: 
[…] it is not the individual thing, the object of our common apprehension, nor is 
it the concept, the object of rational thought and science. Although Idea and con-
cept have something in common, namely the fact that as unities both stand for 
[vertreten] a multiplicity of actual things […]. I certainly do not mean to say that 
Plato had a clear conception of this distinction: in fact, many of his examples and 
descriptions of Ideas are applicable only to concepts. (WR I, 259–260) 
What he meant to demonstrate, and perhaps he should have done so more effec-
tively than he did, is that what we see as concepts acquire a different meaning 
under aesthetic contemplation. The Ideas proceed from a different kind of cog-
nition premised on his correlation theory; they are the counterparts of concepts, 
when and only when we aesthetically contemplate something: 
[…] the distinction between concept and Idea can be expressed figuratively by 
saying: concepts are like dead receptacles; what we place inside actually lies next to 
each other, and we cannot take out more (through analytic judgments) than we 
have put in (through synthetic reflection): in those who have grasped them, on 
the other hand, Ideas develop representations that are novel with respect to con-
cepts sharing the same name: the Idea is like a living and developing organism en-
dowed with generative powers, an organism that can produce things that were not 
already packaged up inside it. (WR I, 261) 
Schopenhauerian Ideas individuate a target of cognition in a different manner 
than their conceptual counterparts. The Idea is the result of another way of 
looking at something, not our ‘looking at something else’. A useful passage that 
further nuances this difference is his distinction between concepts and melo-
dies.27  
                                                   
27  See for example, “[…] melodies are to a certain extent like universal concepts, being abstractions 
from reality […] concepts contain simply the very first forms abstracted from intuition, the out-
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Some commentators argue that we should read the Ideas as our perceiving the 
object’s significance or meaning, which they contend is found in something 
other than its individuality. Aesthetic contemplation, this reading contends, is 
not concerned with the target’s individual significance, but representing its “uni-
versal significance”.28 This reading is not wrong, but, once again, it is important 
to construe this ‘universal significance’ under aesthetic contemplation and not 
under the PSR. The Idea-target relation is not a concept-object or type-token 
relation, but an identity relation between the will and its expression through 
some target of our cognition. By speaking of the ‘universal significance’ of some-
thing we are tempted to comprehend the relation as ‘an object subsumed under a 
concept’ and so we stay wed to perceiving the world through the PSR. Following 
this reading, something has value through its relation to some other universal 
thing called an ‘Idea’. The individual that is the target of our cognition is irrele-
vant. What counts is what – we can take our pick here – ‘nature’, ‘god’, ‘the 
thing-in-itself’, ‘its species’ etc., intends or causes the ‘target’ to be. Aesthetic 
contemplation in this sense shows us the ‘intention’ or the ‘effect’ of something 
other than the target of our cognition. Notice that this reading ascribes a causal 
relationship between the target and the Idea where Schopenhauer argued for an 
identity relationship; it is this ascription that leads us to ostensibly misleading, 
though not necessarily wrong, propositions. Aesthetic contemplation, in the reading 
I defend, shows us a difference in our cognition of the same thing premised on a 
change in us more than a change in the target.29  
Others have argued that it is paradoxical to claim that when we contemplate 
aesthetically an artwork we are not perceiving the particular object that is its 
subject-matter, but “a mysterious entity that eludes ordinary perception”30. This 
suggests that when we move from ordinary cognition under the PSR to aesthetic 
contemplation we somehow lose the object entirely. This objection is correct 
when read loosely, but it also risks overshooting its mark. What is lost is not the 
‘individual target of our cognition’, but cognition of it as an object. Schopenhauer 
perceives a gradual transition from the world filled with objects to the Ideas.31The 
concept is that which is ‘constructed out of mere relations’ (cf. WR II 363–364), 
whilst the Ideas reveal the ‘essence’ or the ‘character’ of that which appears as an 
                                                                                                                       
er shells that have been stripped off things, as it were, and are thus wholly authentic abstracta; 
music on the other hand provides the innermost kernel, prior to all form – the heart of things.” 
(WR I, 291). 
28  See Wicks, Schopenhauer, 98; Vandenabeele, Perception and Cognition, 53; Young, Schopenhauer, 
130–131. 
29  For more on this and how it differs from Kant’s aesthetic ‘ideas’ see Vandenabeele, Objectivity 
of Art, 225–226. 
30  Gardiner, Schopenhauer, 207. See also, Soll, Redemption of Life Through Art, 97–98. 
31  For more on this ‘gradual transition’ and its implications for Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the 
will see Koßler, Artist as Subject, 201–203. 
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object and which we try to conceptualize. We remember that though not wrong, 
‘essence’ or ‘character’ are senseless unless seen from a ‘different side’, which, I 
have argued, is what we recognize through our first-person experience of ‘willing 
something’. In sum, Schopenhauer makes aesthetic contemplation meaningful by 
projecting the will on the concepts of reason.   
 
 
4. The Subjective Correlate: Disinterestedness and the Object’s Purpose 
In a similar fashion, I will juxtapose ordinary ‘subjectivity’ with ‘aesthetic’ sub-
jectivity to give both subjective correlates.  
We perceive something as an object, for Schopenhauer, when we are ‘looking 
for something to will’. The target of cognition seen as an object is correlated by 
our assuming a purposive and action-oriented stance on it as we do when we will 
something in it; our aims make the target meaningful to us. Objects will stand out 
from the background as desirable or fit for purpose (or not and so if they stand 
out at all), on the basis of our own will. The subjective correlate of the cognition 
of an object is therefore, prima facie, our self-interest. The needier we are (i. e., the 
more we search for something to will or for that which we will) the more objects 
and object-relations we perceive as possible motives for us. Self-interest grounds 
the perception of objects as fit to be utilized towards some end. The willing that 
is suspended or suppressed by aesthetic contemplation is, prima facie, egoism.32  
When we perceive the world as filled with objects and object-relations, we 
take an interest in them, or some of them appear as meaningful and-or grab our 
attention, correlative to how they advance our purpose. They promise some 
pleasure, or to aid us in avoiding or getting rid of some pain. Aesthetic contempla-
tion, he argues, happens entirely in the absence of such relations to our own will: 
As soon as any relation between even that purely intuitive object and our own 
will, our own person, re-enters our consciousness, the magic is over: we fall back 
into cognition governed by the principle of sufficient reason, we no longer recog-
nize the Idea but only the particular thing, the link in a chain to which we too be-
long. (WR I, 222) 
The above suggests that self-interest opposes aesthetic contemplation. Although 
it is true, this description of it is incomplete. Self-interest is not the only interest 
that opposes aesthetic contemplation and must be overcome: 
[…] we regard houses, ships, machines, and the like with the idea of their purpose 
and their suitability therefor; human beings with the idea of their relation to us, if 
                                                   
32  Schopenhauer construes egoism as the obsession with our own body and its continued existence 
or enhancement; cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur: “Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals” (OBM), 113–
257; 190–191. 
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they have any, and then of their relation to one another, whether in their present 
actions or according to their position and vocation, perhaps judging their fitness 
for it, and so on […]. In this way the consideration will gain in accuracy and ex-
tent, but remains the same as regards its quality and nature […]. In most cases and 
as a rule, everyone is abandoned to this method of consideration […]. But if, by 
way of exception, it happens that we experience a momentary enhancement of the 
intensity of our intuitive intelligence, we at once see things with entirely different 
eyes, for we now apprehend them no longer according to their relations, but ac-
cording to what they are in and by themselves. (WR II, 372) 
This passage suggests that what is suspended is purposive cognition itself and so 
his conception of ‘interest’ is broader than self-interest and includes the latter 
only by logical extension. Schopenhauer cannot claim that self-interest alone is 
what is suspended; because he later argues that aesthetic contemplation is linked 
to both morality (whose sphere is ‘overcoming of egoism’) and ascetic resigna-
tion (whose sphere is ‘overcoming of all incentives [Triebfedern]’). Can the will-
ing that is suspended then be willing in the extended sense, that is, all purposive 
cognition irrespective of what it may be? Notice that this proposition cannot be 
aesthetic contemplation since it describes ascetic resignation. We know that the 
former can lead to the latter, albeit not necessarily.33 In aesthetic contemplation 
the change in us can “be regarded as an act of self-denial” (WR II, 367), but self-
denial is different from the denial of the will to life, i. e., ascetic resignation. 
Thus, the ‘will’ changes its sense from a narrower to a broader sense. The subjec-
tive correlate of aesthetic contemplation is a broader sense of willing, and so 
what is projected (and overcome) is broader, though, it is not so broad that it 
means negation of all willing.34 The subjective correlate of aesthetic contempla-
tion is therefore broader than that of cognition under the PSR, but not as broad 
as that of ascetic resignation.  
We require a legitimate distinction between aesthetic contemplation and as-
cetic resignation that allows Schopenhauer sufficient room to link the two, but 
not to confound them. The key difference is that in aesthetic contemplation, 
though the purposive stance correlative to the object is momentarily suspended, 
                                                   
33  Cf. “The will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i. e. in the world and life) 
its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this cognition is no im-
pediment to its willing; rather, consciously, deliberately, and with cognition, it wills the life that 
it thus recognizes as such, just as it did as a blind urge before it had this cognition. – The oppo-
site of this, the negation of the will to life, is manifest when willing comes to an end with that 
cognition. The particular, known appearances no longer act as motives for willing, but instead, 
cognition of the essence of the world (which mirrors the will) – cognition that has arisen by 
grasping the Ideas – becomes a tranquillizer of the will and the will freely abolishes itself.” 
(WR I, 311) 
34  Ascetic resignation comes as one reaction (i. e. a negation) stemming from this broader sense of 
willing with its own target, i. e., life itself, as it appears through bodily vicissitudes. 
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the cognition of some purpose or willing in the extended sense, i. e., as the bearer 
of a meaningful perception of the world, is not. It is projected on the target so 
that its own independent will becomes the aim of our focus. In aesthetic con-
templation, we perceive the individual target as willing in its own right. Ascetic 
resignation, suspends all willing including the individual target’s own. It is cogni-
tion of life or living itself, not of some individual. The latter is relational in that 
it is premised on, at least, the relation between us and the individual target of 
cognition, whereas the former is premised on a relation between us and life or 
living itself. This difference is subtle, but can help us untie an unyielding concep-
tual knot. 
When we become self-conscious during ordinary cognition that yields ob-
jects and motives we do so as willing, i. e., we prepare ourselves to act upon 
something. There is a by-fit relationship between readiness to act and the per-
ception of an object; it typifies the perception of something as fit for some use 
that is independent from the target of our cognition. The ‘purposive stance’ and 
the ‘object’ are inseparable correlates that are constitutive of a view of things 
that is a framework for our reasoning or reflecting on something. The subjective 
correlate of the Idea is different to this.  
Aesthetic contemplation does not cognize the object as an object fit for the 
purpose of something other than itself, i. e., something external to it, which al-
ways leads to a purpose for a willing subject independent from the target. We do 
not cognize the house relative to its purpose for the owner, which may be to sell 
or rent it; or the builder which may be to construct it for someone else; or the 
resident which may be to reside in it, and so on with any will or interest inde-
pendent from the house’s. But what does it mean to cognize the house’s own 
will or interest? It is not our perceiving it as some pile of stone organized for our 
needs, but as the result of a struggle between “gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hard-
ness, these universal qualities of stone” (WR I, 239), which he sees as Ideas.35 
We perceive the perfect building that arises from the relations between these 
strivings. We perceive it as striving and want to see how it strives to appear to us 
as it  struggles against its limitations. We want to perceive the ‘perfect organiza-
tion of stone’ that is possible for us and the limits of our intellect, but not for our 
own interest. This is different from aiming to perceive the perfect building for 
living in or for selling etc. Our (aesthetic) interest revises our perception of both 
‘perfection’ and a ‘perfect building’ by “leaving aside its utilitarian function” 
(WR I, 239).  
                                                   
35  Though, Schopenhauer focuses mostly on “the struggle between gravity and rigidity” and claims 
that this is “the only aesthetic content of fine architecture” (WR I, 239). He also makes a more 
general claim about the aesthetic appreciation or content of artefacts, i. e., that they “serve to ex-
press Ideas: only it is not the Idea of the artefact that speaks from them, but rather the Idea of 
the material that has been given this artificial form” (WR I, 236). 
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Aesthetic contemplation suspends everyone’s self-interest in the target except 
for, and, in fact, so that the target’s will can take the center-stage and thus satu-
rate our world-view. We want to perceive its interest, and where interest is not 
applicable to it because it is not a ‘human being’, nor ‘egoism’ because it is not an 
‘animal’, we nevertheless aim to see its striving, struggling, overpowering and so 
on. We suspend the stance that seeks to utilize it, which is not just egoistic. 
There is thus a conditional, not bi-conditional relationship between the purposive 
stance and egoism. To suspend the purposive stance necessarily entails our sus-
pending egoism; to suspend egoism does not necessarily entail suspending the 
purposive stance. The extended sense of willing that Schopenhauer, perhaps 
misleadingly, calls ‘will-less’ or ‘disinterested’, is still a kind of willing and inter-
est we take in something. The sense of willing is broader than the narrower one 
of ‘egoistic willing’ and so is our interest. To flesh it out we should ask: what 
kind of interest would we have in aiming to see what a target of our cognition is 
striving to become but fails to fully be it, such that our cognition does not yield 
an object, but an Idea? Projection of willing underpins this and so what makes it 
meaningful is our aiming to see its willing.  
Our ordinary interest in the object is, for Schopenhauer, always experienced 
correlative to some will that is independent from the target. We can be interested 
in the target of our cognition only correlative to a purpose it serves either for us 
or another individual independent from it, which commits us to perceiving it as 
an object or a motive (its more effective or stronger counterpart). In any percep-
tion and interest other than the previous ones we do not cognize or take an in-
terest in an object at all, but a willing thing. The subjective correlate of our aesthetic 
contemplation is, thus, our wanting to perceive the target’s own will. Daniel Came 
is right to claim that “to be disinterested does not mean to fail to be interested”36 
and that for Schopenhauer, 
[m]y attitude towards an object is disinterested, if and only if, in attending to it, I 
focus only on the object and not any relations that obtain between the object and 
anything apart from the object itself. Disinterestedness is therefore an attitude of 
reflective disengagement from all considerations of utility, which considers only 
what the object is ‘in itself’.37   
He is also right to contend that Schopenhauer’s conception of disinterestedness 
is “reflective disengagement from all considerations of utility”38, although we 
should be cautious about what we mean by ‘reflective’. Our suspending consid-
erations of utility does not only refer to the target’s “relation to our will”39 or 
                                                   
36  Came, Daniel: Disinterestedness and Objectivity. In: European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2009), 
91–100; 95. 
37  Ibid., 95. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Ibid., 96.  
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how we seek to utilize it, but to any will (in the extended sense) that is inde-
pendent from it; only by extension does this include our own will. We suspend a 
consideration into how anyone or anything would utilize it. Nevertheless, we 
should go further than the above passage is able to take us because, for Schopen-
hauer, the object ‘in itself’ is meaningless for us when put in these terms. The 
object ‘in itself’ seemingly interests us according to Came, but how do we make 
sense of the fact that ‘something’ ostensibly “useless and unprofitable” (WR II, 
388) interests us? It does so, I have argued, because it is not perceived as an ob-
ject at all, but as the objective outcome of willing, striving, overpowering and so 
on. This suggests a different conception of ‘utility’ that then makes our interest 
meaningful in a different way. The previous is not encapsulated by the ‘disen-
gagement from all considerations of utility’, which would leave us with nothing.  
Disinterestedness, for Schopenhauer, is suspending the kind of cognition 
that permits its target to be perceived as an object. This requires more than the 
suspension of our individual will, which is unfortunately overlooked by some 
commentators. For example, Denham argues that in aesthetic contemplation we are 
[…] liberated only from a specific species of will, leaving behind or transcending a 
certain ordinary species of activity, viz. the fulfilment of individual and egocentric 
aims and desires.40  
She qualifies her claim by adding that Schopenhauer intends ‘silencing of the 
will’ in 
[…] a very specific and limited sense of that phrase: it is not all modes of willing 
but only, as it were, egocentric willing that is dissipated in aesthetic experience.41  
Remember, however, that the ‘will’ Schopenhauer construed as suspended in 
aesthetic contemplation intends to capture all purposive cognition that aims to 
utilize the target towards an end independent from its own, which yields the 
cognition of an object or of something fit for purpose or use. An artwork can be 
seen as an object, but not during the aesthetic contemplation or appreciation of 
an artwork.42 Aesthetic contemplation is meaningful if we no longer perceive an 
object, but how the target of our cognition wills to appear to us.  
 
                                                   
40  Denham, Alison E.: Attuned, Transcendent & Transfigured: Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Psychology. 
In: Nietzsche on Art & Life, ed. by Daniel Came, New York 2013, 163–200, 176. 
41  Denham, Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Psychology, 179. 
42  In fact, for Schopenhauer, an artwork on its own is just a target of cognition that can be utilized 
like any other and so seen as an object: “[…] the goal of all the other arts is to arouse cognition 
of these Ideas through the presentation of particular things (artworks themselves are always such 
things) – something that is possible only given a corresponding alteration in the subject of cog-
nition” (WR I, 284). To perceive the artwork as aiming to facilitate cognition of an Idea as op-
posed to aiming to be consumed by us requires a necessary and correlative change in us. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
Cognizing the target’s own individual will is the cornerstone of Schopenhauer’s 
‘aesthetic contemplation’. To acquire better insight into what it means, I have 
argued that we should take him by his word. I have suggested an approach to the 
Ideas that presupposes that aesthetic contemplation is a cognition of something 
and so is premised on his correlation theory of cognition. It is not the cognition 
of an object, but of an Idea. The Idea is not and cannot possibly be separate from 
the target of our cognition or its subjective correlate, i.e., suspension of the pur-
posive and introduction of a new, so-called ‘disinterested’ stance. We should 
thus dispense with the conception of the Schopenhauerian Ideas as ‘things’. To 
make the Ideas meaningful we have to project willing (i. e. the will-body identity 
inherent to willing something) on the world and the targets of our cognition. 
This projection aims to perceive the target’s individual will; so we are ‘disinter-
ested’ in the sense of being interested in perceiving the target’s ‘will’ rather than 
in acting upon it for some will independent from it. Ideas are thus adequate ob-
jectivations of the target’s willing, striving, overpowering and so on, understood 
as projections of the contemplator's own will premised on the will-body identity.  
 
